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lmost three years after the Euromaidan revolution, Ukraine’s leadership has fallen 
woefully short in delivering on its promises to fight against corruption within the 
judiciary, clean up political party financing and decentralise government functions. The 
customs service has yet to be reformed, property rights are far from being ensured and state-
owned enterprises have not been privatised. Major reforms aimed at combating corruption 
have consistently been resisted, delayed, manipulated or appear on paper only. The country’s 
elite must produce more tangible results in order to earn the trust of the citizens and ease the 
growing fatigue among Ukraine’s international partners.  
Over the last decade, Ukraine has rarely had a problem with accepting and institutionalising 
European norms and rules, in theory, but successive governments have been selective in 
implementing them. In the post-Euromaidan period, Ukraine has introduced several 
institutional modifications in the name of combating corruption, the most important being the 
adoption of an Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2014-2017, covering the three branches of 
government (executive, legislative and judiciary). Other institutional modifications include the 
launch of an open competition for the new Supreme Court, setting up the Public Integrity 
Council, the Asset Recovery and Management Agency, the National Agency on the Prevention 
of Corruption, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialised Anti-Corruption 
Prosecutor’s Office and establishing an electronic system for the disclosure of assets.  
A little progress has been made in the fight against corruption through the setting up of a public 
e-procurement system. For example, the procurement of medicine via international 
organisations reduced corruption in the field. The raising of energy prices and cleaning up the 
banking sector have also indirectly contributed to the reduction of corruption in these areas. 
Yet, these small wins do not add up to the comprehensive, systemic change that the country 
needs. It is therefore not surprising that these reforms did little to convince both insiders and 
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outsiders of the government’s commitment. As seen through the eyes of international 
organisations, Ukraine made scant progress in fighting corruption in 2016. For example, in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the country improved by merely 2 
points and ranks 131th out of 176 countries, accompanied by Kazakhstan, Russia, Nepal and 
Iran. Ukraine slipped one point in the Global Competitiveness Report, two points in The 
Economist’s Intelligence Unit’s Country Risk Ratings but went up by one point in the World 
Bank’s Doing Business Index. 
Ukraine’s weak state institutions were never a match for the powerful domestic elites 
consisting of oligarchs and their political allies, who successfully obstructed the implementation 
of crucial reforms. Safeguarding one’s personal business interests takes priority over the 
demand to strengthen the Ukrainian state and the confidence of its citizens in it. 
The institutional changes have done little to change behaviour and attitudes. For example, the 
goal of the independent National Anti-Corruption Bureau is to investigate high-level officials 
suspected of corruption, but its work has been seriously obstructed since its establishment. 
The unreformed Prosecutor General’s office, which retains its Soviet-style powers of coercion, 
undermines the work of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, whose detectives even got into 
fist-fights with members of the General Prosecutor’s Office in the course of performing their 
duties. Moreover, when the Bureau asked Rada to remove the immunity granted to one of the 
parliamentarians who was under investigation, Rada delayed the process so much that the 
parliamentarian in question slipped out of the country before he could be prosecuted. 
Furthermore, the corrupt courts routinely delay hearings for those who have been charged 
with crimes of corruption. Although the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialised 
Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office have made some progress, the commitment they show in 
carrying out their responsibilities is extremely low (out of 63 indictments sent to the courts, 
only four people received a prison sentence), and no high-level official has been convicted to 
date.  
The National Agency on the Prevention of Corruption is another stark example of a new 
institution whose work is undermined by the elites. The composition and the mandate of the 
National Agency on the Prevention of Corruption are impeccable on paper, but in practice, even 
its establishment was marred by delays and manipulations on the part of the government in 
almost every step.  
One of the major requirements imposed by the EU on Ukraine was the setting up an electronic 
database for officials to declare their financial assets. The positive outcome is that over 100,000 
Ukrainian politicians and senior civil servants, including the President and the Prime Minister, 
have publicly declared their wealth. The actual implementation of the system was delayed, 
however, and when the declarations were finally submitted, they confirmed what Ukrainians 
had suspected for a long time: the members of their government are much richer than the 
average citizen. In fact, a Ukrainian who earns an average salary has to work about 125 years 
to make as much money as an average member of the government. The future of the e-
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declaration is now under challenge by a group of Rada members who filed a case in the 
Constitutional Court charging that it is unconstitutional.   
Corruption is pervasive in Ukraine not only at the national level, but also at the regional and 
local levels. By shifting powers to regional and local authorities, the aim was to bring 
government closer to the people. Although a body of legislation was adopted to facilitate 
decentralisation, the administrative capacity of the regional, district and local communities has 
yet to be built. By simply shifting more power and more money from the national to the local 
level, the risk of corruption is also transferred – an unfortunate reality that has not been 
adequately tackled.  As a result, some businesses are now facing difficulties not only at the 
hands of national but also some local and regional authorities.  
Regulating the funding of political parties in Ukraine also remains a daunting task. Most of the 
parties are paid for and controlled by oligarchs. By having parliamentarians on their payroll, 
oligarchs secure a role in the politics of the country and thus safeguard their business interests. 
Rada passed a new party financing law in July 2016, which is another fine piece of legislation 
on paper, but one that has yet to be enforced despite a massive number of alleged violations.   
The EU is now pushing for the establishment of specialised anti-corruption chambers to 
function inside the existing court system in Ukraine. In itself, this is a good idea and if done 
properly it is likely to help Ukraine’s vibrant civil society in its fight for a better future for the 
country. Yet once again, the formation of one more institution will not save the country. 
Arguably, some of the instruments recently introduced in Ukraine to fight corruption have an 
even greater reach than those deployed in Georgia, but the post-Euromaidan era has not 
ushered in the kinds of dramatic practices Georgians witnessed following the Rose revolution.  
The lesson for the EU is clear. Progress on paper in Ukraine should not be rewarded. Having a 
government that calls itself pro-European is not an excuse for leniency on corruption. In fact, 
the EU ought to do everything in its power to avoid a repeat in Ukraine of the sad saga that 
played out in Moldova. Despite the fact that the latter country has been greatly supported by 
the EU politically and economically, its leadership failed to address corruption and damaged 
not only its own credibility but that of the EU as well. The EU’s assistance should go to those 
who fight for a corruption-free European Ukraine and not to those who merely declare 
themselves as European but act as a ‘wolf in a sheep’s clothing’. It is important that the EU 
continues to support the dynamic civil society of Ukraine and improves its strategic 
communication. To this end, the new EU initiative against corruption, led by the Danes, is an 
important step.  
The EU should not accept the assertions of high-level Ukrainian officials that the country has 
made huge strides in the last three years, compared to the decades following independence. 
Such logic is flawed for two reasons. Firstly, as Georgia’s experience demonstrates, efforts to 
fight corruption are most effective if done in the very first years after a revolution. Secondly, 
being rated better than the Yushchenko or Yanukovych administration should provide little 
cause for celebration.  
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The EU must firmly insist that the Ukrainian elite engages in genuine state-building by tackling 
the corruption that has consistently undermined the country’s foundations. And if the 
authorities do not respond appropriately, the EU should be ready to withdraw its support from 
Ukraine and at an earlier stage than was done in the case of Moldova. More importantly, no 
one else should be more concerned about the lack of the progress in tackling corruption than 
Ukraine itself. It is only through reform that Ukraine will provide counter evidence to the Trump 
administration’s narrative of Russia and make it easy for the EU to maintain the sanctions 
against Russia and continue improving Ukraine with much-needed financial support and 
technical assistance. After all, if Ukraine does not increase its resilience, it will have a hard time 
enduring continued Russian intervention. As shelling in Eastern Donbass persists and yet 
another human tragedy unfolds on the European continent, the fight for a stable, well-
governed and democratic Ukraine remains the prerogative of the day. 
